Article: From East to West: combatting due process paranoia and the evolution of early dismissal procedures in international arbitration
Iain Sharp FCIArb
Partner (Marine & Trade – Singapore), Hill Dickinson LLP
1. Introduction
Due process is the “procedural cornerstone of the rule of law”[1] designed to defend fundamental procedural rights. As arbitral tribunals constantly strive to maintain a balance between due process and efficiency, under the threat of due process challenges, the phenomenon of “due process paranoia” has emerged. Early dismissal procedures have the potential to resolve disputes more efficiently, however a proper framework is essential to ensure that the process is fair and to provide reassurance to arbitral tribunals as to the suitability of their use.
In this paper, I explore the tension between due process and early dismissal procedures in international arbitration and the background to the development of early dismissal procedures by major arbitral institutions in the East (including SIAC and HKIAC) and the West (including LCIA and ICC).
I compare and contrast the approaches to early dismissal procedures adopted and developed by major arbitral institutions in the East and the West. Through an analysis of casework and other reports from arbitral institutions, I consider how early dismissal procedures are being used and the extent to which due process paranoia may still impact early dismissal applications and the success rates of the same.
I also look at how pro-arbitration jurisdictions consider due process challenges to awards particularly where early dismissal procedures in arbitration are involved, as well as legislative developments in arbitration law. Finally, I consider how early dismissal procedures might further be improved within the context of arbitral rules and/or guidance to mitigate and/or dispel due process paranoia and achieve the desired result of resolving claims and issues fairly in a more time and cost-effective way.
2. What is due process paranoia?
Queen Mary University and White & Case’s 2015 International Arbitration Survey[2] observed that: “A growing concern in international arbitration is a perceived reluctance by tribunals to act decisively in certain situations for fear of the award being challenged on the basis of a party not having had the chance to present its case fully (“due process paranoia”).”[3]
Excessive caution on the part of arbitral tribunals can affect the efficient management of arbitral proceedings resulting in increased costs and lack of speed. It has been said that “two of the main complaints against international commercial arbitration are that it has become too expensive and too slow”[4] and that “the arbitral process has lost the informality and expedition that once characterised it”.[5]
Arbitral tribunals are under a duty to adopt procedures which avoid unnecessary delay and expense. They are also under a duty to give each party a reasonable opportunity to put their case. Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1985 (the Model Law) states that” “The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity of presenting its case”. This ‘”due process” clause has been dubbed the “Magna Carta” of arbitral procedure[6]. So how can arbitral tribunals balance the competing considerations of due process and efficiency and the perceived tension between the two[7]?
A key concern about the use of an early dismissal procedure is that it may be perceived as curtailing a party’s right to be heard or the opportunity to put its case. In the absence of specific provisions authorising early dismissal, arbitral tribunals have been wary about the early dismissal of a claim or defence for fear of exposing their decisions or awards to challenge (or enforcement under the New York Convention being resisted[8]) on the grounds that due process has not been followed.
3. The origins of early dismissal procedures
Early determination or early dismissal of ‘frivolous’ claims or defences (ones lacking in legal basis or legal merit) was already customary to common law litigation in jurisdictions including England and Wales, Singapore and the United States (and domestic arbitration in some jurisdictions) before it was introduced to international arbitration. Similar rules also appear in the procedures of international courts and tribunals[9], such as Article 35(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR)[10].
The main objective of such procedures is to avoid delay and to ensure that disputes are determined efficiently. One might say that early dismissal procedures have come relatively late in the day in international arbitration. Certainly, in terms of express procedures in arbitral rules this is probably true.
Arbitral tribunals have arguably always had the inherent power to adopt early dismissal procedures within their case management powers. Some have argued that early dismissal procedures run contrary to the duty of arbitral tribunals to afford parties a reasonable opportunity to present their case[11]. This has unfortunately fed the due process paranoia.
It has been said that early determination in international arbitration can provide several decisive benefits including streamlining the process, narrowing the scope of the dispute and improving the quality of the award[12]. The use of such procedures is consistent with duty of arbitral tribunals to conduct proceedings efficiently.
In 2006, the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was first to introduce an express early disposition procedure into its arbitration rules allowing arbitral tribunals to dismiss proceedings summarily if they find that the underlying claims are “manifestly without legal merit”. At that time none of the major institutional arbitration rules contained any comparable express early dismissal procedures[13].
As to the emergence of early dismissal procedures, Redfern observes “Due process is not a ‘one-way street’: and summary procedures may, in the right circumstances, be entirely consistent with an arbitral tribunal’s duty to adopt procedures that avoid unnecessary delay or expense.”[14]
4. How have early dismissal procedures developed in the East?
4.1 Singapore
In August 2016, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC) was the first major arbitral institution to introduce into the 6th edition of the SIAC Rules (2016 SIAC Rules) an express provision for the early dismissal of claims and defences by arbitral tribunals, Rule 29.1[15]. Under this new rule, an application could be made under the 2016 SIAC Rules on the basis that a claim or defence is: (i) manifestly without legal merit; or (ii) manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The availability of this early dismissal procedure to both claimant and respondent under SIAC’s Rule 29.1 distinguished it from Rule 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules which on its face applies to objections to claims alone.
As noted above, Rule 29.1 of the 2016 SIAC Rules requires a lack of legal merit, and in respect of a challenge on the basis of merit or jurisdiction, the standard is a ‘manifest lack’. However a definition of the standard of a ‘manifest lack’ is not provided in the 2016 SIAC Rules.[16]
As to question of procedural fairness/due process, Rule 29.3 states:
“The Tribunal may, in its discretion, allow the application for the early dismissal of a claim or defence under Rule 29.1 to proceed. If the application is allowed to proceed, the Tribunal shall, after giving the parties the opportunity to be heard, decide whether to grant, in whole or in part, the application for early dismissal under Rule 29.1.”
In August 2023, SIAC announced the release of the public consultation draft of the 7th edition of the SIAC Rules (2023 SIAC Draft Rules)[17]. The early dismissal procedure appears at Rule 47 of the 2023 SIAC Draft Rules with the only significant change being a reduction of the time period (from 60 days to 45 days) for the arbitral tribunal to render its decision from the date of filing of the application for early dismissal.
Following a public consultation period, the 7th edition of the SIAC Rules was released and came into effect on 1 January 2025 (2025 SIAC Rules)[18]. Rule 47.1 of the 2025 SIAC Rules still requires a lack of legal merit, and in respect of a challenge on the basis of merit or jurisdiction, the standard is manifest lack. The 2025 SIAC Rules still provide no definition of the standard of ‘manifest lack’ or guidance on what constitutes “manifestly without legal merit” or “manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal”.
4.2 Hong Kong
In 2018, the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) introduced into its rules an early determination procedure under Article 43. Under this article, upon the request of a party and upon consultation with all other parties, arbitral tribunals were given the express power to decide one or more points of law or fact on the basis that: “(a) such points of law or fact are manifestly without merit; or (b) such points of law or face are manifestly outside the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction; or (c) even if such points of law or fact are submitted by another party to be assumed to be correct, no award could be rendered in favour of that party.”[19]
It is noted that language of Article 43 of the 2018 HKIAC Rules refers to making a decision on any point of law or fact that might be “manifestly without merit” with the exclusion of ‘legal’. There is no definition of the standard of ‘manifestly without’ or ‘manifestly outside’[20].
In May 2024, HKIAC announced the release if its new 2024 Administered Arbitration Rules to take effect on 1 June 2024 (2024 HKIAC Rules)[21]. Under Article 13.6 of the 2024 HKIAC Rules, the arbitral tribunal is now expressly empowered to determine preliminary issues, bifurcate proceedings, conduct the arbitration in sequential stages and decide the stage at which any issues are to be determined. The arbitral tribunal’s discretion to adopt such procedures must be exercised “after consulting with the parties”.
The language of Article 13.6 complements the early determination procedure introduced at Article 43 of the 2018 HKIAC Rules and helps to reduce the scope for disputes as to the existence or extent of the arbitral tribunal’s powers in relation to particular points.
4.3 China – CIETAC
On 1 January 2024, the new version of the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) Arbitration Rules came into force. Amongst the key amendments to the CIETAC Rules was the introduction of early dismissal provisions, thus bringing the CIETAC Rules broadly into line with SIAC’s and HKIAC’s Rules.
Article 50 of the 2024 CIETAC Rules provides that a party may request the early dismissal of a claim or counterclaim where the claim or counterclaim is “manifestly without legal merit, or manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal”. As a safeguard against unmeritorious requests for early dismissal[22], the tribunal has the discretion to ask the requesting party to provide justifiable grounds for its request, and to demonstrate that the early dismissal process will expedite the overall proceedings.
5. How have early dismissal procedures developed in the West?
5.1 LCIA
Prior to the release of the LCIA Arbitration Rules 2020 in October 2020 (LCIA Rules 2020) an early determination procedure was only available under the broad case management powers afforded to an arbitral tribunal. In practice, it was rarely used.
The formalisation of an express early determination procedure[23] in the LCIA Rules 2020 gave arbitral tribunals the power to determine that any claim, defence, counterclaim, cross-claim, defence to counterclaim or defence to cross-claim is manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, or is inadmissible or “manifestly without merit” (noticeably with the exclusion of ‘legal’), and where appropriate to issue and order or award to that effect. In addition, an arbitral tribunal has the power to make an early determination upon its own initiative. In either case, such determination is to be made after giving the parties a reasonable opportunity to state their views.
5.2 ICC
Whereas a number of arbitral institutions have introduced express early dismissal procedures in their rules, the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) has taken the view that the Tribunal’s general case management powers under the ICC Rules already encompass such tools. On 30 October 2017, the ICC published guidance designed to provide greater clarity on the scope for “immediate dismissal of manifestly unmeritorious claims or defences” under Article 22 of the 2017 ICC Rules.
In its press release the ICC stated:
“The immediate disposition of a manifestly unmeritorious claim or defence may, in the proper circumstances, be a useful tool to increase the time and cost efficiency of the arbitration. This addition aims at clarifying that this procedural tool is available under the ICC Rules of Arbitration.”[24]
The main purpose of the guidance note appears to have been to provide more certainty for parties and arbitrators on the case management tools available under the ICC Rules. However, the guidance note does not set out the type of procedure to be followed in the context of an “expeditious determination”, nor does it clarify the substantive criteria a tribunal should apply to determine whether or not a claim or defence is “manifestly devoid of merit” or “manifestly outside the tribunal’s jurisdiction”.
In January 2021, the ICC published a further guidance note to parties and arbitral tribunals[25]. The guidance note contains further guidance in relation to applications under Rule 22. that “If the arbitral tribunal allows the application to proceed, it shall promptly adopt the procedural measures it considers appropriate, after consulting the parties” and the responding party or parties “shall be given a fair opportunity to answer the application”. As with the previous guidance note, no clarification is provided as to the substantive criteria a tribunal should apply to determining an application under Article 22.
With the exception of the approach taken by the ICC, the international arbitration rules of the major arbitral institutions have evolved to the stage that they are now broadly aligned with regard to the nature and scope of early dismissal powers granted to arbitral tribunals, the flexibility given to arbitral tribunals to decide the appropriate procedure. The rules all contain a high threshold test for a successful early dismissal application, incorporating similar terms such as “manifestly without merit”, “manifestly without legal merit” and “manifestly without jurisdiction”.
5.3 ICSID
As noted above, the starting point for early dismissal in international arbitration was the ICSID Arbitration Rules 2006 (specifically Rule 41(5)). As can been seen from the development of early dismissal procedures by major arbitral institutions, this rule set out the now well-known ‘manifestly’ without legal merit standard, but did not include provisions for dismissal of a claim based on determination of defence, facts or evidence[26]. The ICSID Arbitration Rules were revised in 2022 and the procedure to dispose of a claim that is “manifestly without legal merit” was amended to clarify that the objection may relate to the substance of the claim, the jurisdiction of ICSID, or the competence of the arbitral tribunal[27].
6. The use and success of early dismissal procedures
Following the adoption of early dismissal procedures by major arbitral institutions, what evidence do we have of the use of those procedures and the relative success or failure of applications? Given the confidential nature of international arbitration, we must look to the annual reports and statistics of those institutions.
6.1 Illustrations from the East
Since the introduction of the early dismissal procedure under Rule 29 of the 2016 SIAC Rules in 2016, SIAC reports[28] that 77 applications for early dismissal were filed with SIAC in the years 2017-2024, of which 35 were allowed to proceed, and of those only 8 were granted. The SIAC Annual Reports do not explain what happened to a further 11 applications that were allowed to proceed but whose status was pending.
Turning to the HKIAC, since the introduction of the early determination procedure under Article 43 of the 2018 HKIAC Rules, HKIAC reports[29] that a total of 16 applications were filed with HKIAC in the years 2020-2024, of which 4 were granted.
6.2 Illustrations from the West
Like SIAC, the LCIA provides some statistical data on early determination applications since the introduction of the procedure into the LCIA Rules 2020.
LCIA reports[30] that 71 applications for early determination were filed with LCIA in the years 2021-2024, of which 11 applications were granted and 3 were partially granted/rejected. The LCIA Annual Casework Reports do not explain what happened to a further 15 applications whose status was pending.
The most common grounds cited for the applications in the LCIA Annual Casework Reports were that the claims or defence to the claims were manifestly without merit, and/or that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to decide the dispute, and/or that the claims were inadmissible.
By way of comparison, from 2006 to 2016, Rule 41(5) was invoked in 25 cases, approximately 5 per cent of the total number of registered ICSID arbitration cases in that 10-year period.[31]
The statistics suggest a continuing reluctance by parties and arbitral tribunals to use early dismissal procedures for fear of the risk that the arbitral tribunal’s decision or award may be challenged.
7. What is the attitude to due process paranoia in pro-arbitration jurisdictions and how have challenges to early dismissal decisions been regarded?
In the 2020 case of CMNC v Jaguar Energy[32], the Singapore Court of Appeal expressed concern at the cynical misuse of due process and natural justice complaints in the context of arbitration proceedings.
In declining to set aside an award for an alleged breach of natural justice, the Court provided guidance on the balance to be struck between genuine due process concerns and the arbitral tribunal’s legitimate duty to ensure the prompt and effective resolution of the dispute. In the introduction to its judgment, the Court emphasised that the “misuse of due process complaints can lead to defensive procedural decision-making on the part of the tribunal in an effort to safeguard its award” and that exposes parties to delays and increased costs and “undermines and cheapens the real importance of due process in international arbitration”.
A relatively recent decision by the Singapore Court of Appeal (SGCA) offers some insight into how a successful early determination application may be treated by the Singapore courts[33]. The borrowers under a loan facility agreement commenced a SIAC arbitration and argued that the agreement had been discharged by frustration, on account of the COVID-19 pandemic. In response, the lenders applied for early dismissal of the borrowers’ claims[34] claiming that the borrowers’ contention that the agreement had been discharged by frustration was “manifestly without legal merit”.
At the hearing of the application, the borrowers sought to raise a new argument that was not part of their pleaded case regarding an alleged oral collateral contract. The tribunal issued a partial award finding that the facts argued by the borrowers could not be interpreted to conclude that the parties had entered into a collateral contract. As a result, the tribunal found that the borrowers’ argument on discharge by frustration was manifestly without legal merit.
The borrowers applied to the Singapore International Court (SICC) to set aside the award on the basis that the tribunal had failed to assume the existence of the collateral contract when dealing with the application for early dismissal. The SICC dismissed the application. On appeal, the SGCA held that the tribunal was correct to conclude that the argument in respect of the collateral contract would not enable the borrowers to defeat the early dismissal application and agreed with the tribunal that the amendment to the borrowers’ case and the collateral contract did not enable the borrowers to defeat the early dismissal application. The decision notes that the tribunal “accepted that it was only where a claim or defence was undoubtedly legally unsustainable that Rule 29.1 could be properly invoked”.
As regards the English courts, two relatively recent cases should logically help to dispel due process paranoia in the minds of arbitral tribunals. The decisions provide some reassurance that the use of early dismissal procedures in international arbitration does not necessarily infringe due process rights and should not, in principle, create the basis for challenge or resisting enforcement in England and Wales. In Travis Coal[35] the Court rejected an argument that a summary judgment process by arbitrators (in an ICC arbitration in New York) necessarily amounts to a denial of due process and found that this was not a question that could be addressed in general terms without regard to the particular case, including the scope of the powers available to a tribunal and the procedure that is adopted. The tribunal had conducted the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner and gave each party a fair opportunity to present its case.
Uttam Galva v Gunvor[36] concerned a challenge to an LME award by a sole arbitrator relating to a dispute over delivery and payment for a shipment of nickel. Gunvor applied to the tribunal for a partial final award, essentially seeking summary dismissal, for payment of bills of exchange on the basis that the “general rule is that the Court will give summary judgment for a claimant on a bill of exchange save in exceptional circumstances”[37]. The tribunal refused to render a partial award but instead ordered the buyer to make an interim payment on account of the monetary award the tribunal considered was likely to be recovered. The buyer, Uttam Galva, challenged the award under section 67 of the Arbitration Act 1996 arguing that the tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction.
In considering the buyer’s application, the Court made it clear that the alleged “unavailability” of summary dismissal procedures in arbitral proceedings has been “overstated”[38]. In addition, the Court did not accept that “relief akin to summary judgment would not be available in arbitration in an appropriate case” or that “the availability of summary judgment procedures in international arbitration, and specifically under the ICC Rules, appears to be a matter of controversy in England”.
Following an extensive review of the Arbitration Act 1996 (including two consultations), in September 2023 the Law Commission of England and Wales issued a final report[39] on recommended changes to the Act. The report included a proposal for the introduction of an express power for the tribunal to make an award on a summary basis where the issue in question has no real prospect of success. The first consultation paper set out a detailed background on due process concerns regarding summary determination. In confirming its recommendation, the Law Commission stated that “a reasonable opportunity to put one’s case should not entitle the arbitral party with a fatally weak case to draw out the procedure excessively, thereby generating wasted costs, and delaying the inevitable resolution of the dispute”. The Arbitration Bill was subsequently introduced into Parliament on 21 November 2023.
The Arbitration Act 2025 eventually received Royal Assent on 24 February 2025 and introduced a new power (under section 39A) which allows an arbitral tribunal, following the application of a party, to make an award if a claim or issue (or defence to a claim or issue) has no “real prospect of succeeding”. The arbitral tribunal is required to give the parties a “reasonable opportunity to make representations” with respect to any such award. The objective of this new power is to streamline the arbitral process and save the time and expense of a full hearing of unmeritorious claims.
In March 2025, the Ministry of Law in Singapore (MinLaw) launched a public consultation on the International Arbitration Act 1994 of Singapore[40]. MinLaw invited members of the public to provide views on the report commissioned by MinLaw from the Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy (SIDRA) to study the international arbitration regime in Singapore and the International Arbitration Act (IAA). Included within the eight issues of focus is the issue of whether the summary disposal powers of arbitral tribunals should be set out in the IAA. Currently the IAA does not expressly set out summary disposal powers of arbitral tribunals and MinLaw has sought views on “Whether the IAA should be amended to expressly provide that unless otherwise agreed by parties, the arbitral tribunal has the power to summarily dispose of any issue, claim or defence (or part thereof) in dispute by way of an award.” The public consultation period ran from 21 March to 2 May 2025 and so the next evolution of the IAA in Singapore is eagerly awaited.
8. Conclusion
It is recognised that arbitral tribunals have a difficult task in finding a balance between efficiency and procedural fairness. Arbitral tribunals are under a duty to adopt procedures that avoid unnecessary delay while ensuring that the principles of due process are upheld, to safeguard the award and its enforceability. Early dismissal procedures provide an important tool to avoid delay and ensure that disputes are determined as efficiently as possible.
Despite the progress already made by leading arbitral institutions to grant arbitral tribunals express powers to adopt early dismissal procedures, the statistical data currently available suggests that early dismissal procedures are still only used in a relatively small number of cases, and the success rates of such applications is quite low. It is unclear whether the reluctance of arbitral parties and arbitral tribunals to more fully endorse the use early dismissal procedures is due to ongoing concerns about the potential risks of challenge and/or due process paranoia. Certainly, such concerns do not appear to be well-founded upon reviewing the approach from courts in pro-arbitration jurisdictions.
It would perhaps be helpful for major arbitral institutions to adopt a consistent approach to publishing data on early dismissal applications and, to the extent possible, their outcomes. The major arbitral institutions have taken steps to broadly align the early dismissal powers granted to arbitral tribunals (both in terms of nature and scope) and flexibility to determine appropriate procedures. In addition to this, arbitral tribunals might benefit further from practice notes/guidance from major arbitral institutions, particularly in relation to tests to apply, to help to encourage a consistent approach to the implementation of early dismissal procedures.
Arbitral tribunals have often been reluctant to exercise their wide discretion in adopting early dismissal procedures due to fear of challenges and due process paranoia. However, the positive disposition of courts in pro-arbitration jurisdictions towards the use of early dismissal procedures in arbitration, should provide a sufficient degree of reassurance to arbitral tribunals to enable them to use these procedures with more confidence, without fear of opportunistic cynical challenges. Furthermore, the continued evolution of well-drafted procedural rules and guidance by arbitral institutions, and developments in arbitration legislation, should help to firmly establish early dismissal procedures as an effective tool to resolve claims and issues fairly in a more time and cost-effective way.
To quote the Chief Justice of Singapore, Sundaresh Menon:
“if arbitration wishes to safeguard due process and its legitimacy as an institution, then it must assiduously avoid due process paranoia. In an age where the problems of complexity and scarcity often strain against each other, the preservation of due process and the legitimacy of systems of dispute resolution require not greater complexity but more simplicity; not rigidity but flexibility; and not conventionalism but innovation”[41].
[1] Lucy Reed, ‘Ab(use) of due process: sword vs shield’ (2017) Volume 33 Number 3 Arbitration International 361, 366
[2] Queen Mary University and White & Case, ‘2015 International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitration’ 2, 10 <http://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/research/2015/index.html> accessed 21 September 2024
[3] See also Queen Mary University and Pinsent Masons, ‘Future of International Energy Arbitration Survey Report 2022’ 20 January 2023, 32: “One question that arises out of this issue is whether the various arbitral rules sufficiently empower arbitrators to make decisions at an early stage, or whether it is the arbitrators who are reluctant to utilise the powers that have been given to them (due, for example, to what has been termed ‘procedural paranoia’).” <https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/Future-of-International-Energy-Arbitration-Survey-Report.pdf> accessed 21 September 2024
[4] Gerald Aksen, ‘Chapter 1: Taming the Twin Dragons of International Arbitration: Cost and Delay’ in Patricia Louise Shaughnessy and Sherlin Tung (eds) The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer (Kluwer Law International 2017) 1
[5] Philipp Habegger, ‘Chapter 13: The Arbitrator’s Duty of Efficiency: A Call for Increased Utilization of Arbitral Powers’, in Patricia Louise Shaughnessy and Sherlin Tung (eds) The Powers and Duties of an Arbitrator: Liber Amicorum Pierre A. Karrer (Kluwer Law International 2017) 123, 135
[6] Sameer Sharma, ‘Due Process “Paranoia”: Turning Away from Judicial Attitudes and Looking for Answers Within’, in Stavros Brekoulakis (ed) (2018) Volume 84 Issue 4 Arbitration: The International Journal of Arbitration, Mediation and Dispute Management (Chartered Institute of Arbitrators; Sweet & Maxwell), 314
[7] Sundaresh Menon, ‘Dispelling Due Process Paranoia: Fairness, Efficiency and the Rule of Law’, in Lawrence Boo and Gary B. Born (eds) (2021) Volume 17 Issue 1 Asian International Arbitration Journal (Kluwer Law International) 1, 5
[8] See article V(1)(b) United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1959 (New York Convention)
[9] Michele Potestà and Marija Sobat ‘Frivolous Claims in International Adjudication: A Study of ICSID Rule 41(5) and of Procedures of Other Courts and Tribunals to Dismiss Claims Summarily’ (2012) 3.1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 137, 139-142
[10] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953)
[11] Nigel Blackaby et al. Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, OUP 2023) para 6.37, 337
[12] Mino Han and Arjun Solanki ‘Early Determination: A Secret Recipe for Arbitral Efficiency?’ <https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2023/05/12/early-determination-a-secret-recipe-for-arbitral-efficiency/> accessed 21 September 2024
[13] David L. Wallach ‘The Emergence of Early Disposition Procedures in International Arbitration’ (2021) Volume 37 Number 4 Arbitration International 835, 837
[14] Nigel Blackaby et al. Redfern & Hunter on International Arbitration (7th edn, OUP 2023) para 6.39, 338
[15] Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC Rules) 6th edn, 1 August 2016
[16] John Choong et al., A Guide to the SIAC Arbitration Rules (2nd edn, OUP 2018) 208-209
[17] <https://siac.org.sg/siac-announces-public-consultation-on-the-draft-7th-edition-of-the-siac-arbitration-rules> accessed 21 September 2024
[18] Arbitration Rules of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC Rules) 7th edn, 1 January 2025
[19] The Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre Administered Arbitration Rules 2018
[20] The scope of Article 43 is quite broad and follows the example of Article 39(1) of the 2017 Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC) Arbitration Rules: “[a] party may request that the Arbitral Tribunal decide one or more issues of fact or law by way of summary procedure…” rather than Rule 29.1 of the SIAC Rules
[21] <https://hkiac.org/news/hkiac-releases-2024-administered-arbitration-rules-effective-1-june-2024> accessed 3 November 2024
[22] Adding an additional procedural hurdle for applicants to overcome
[23] Article 22.1(viii) LCIA Arbitration Rules 2020
[24] <https://iccwbo.org/news-publications/news/icc-court-revises-note-to-include-expedited-determination-of-unmeritorious-claims-or-defences/> accessed 3 November 2024
[25] <https://iccwbo.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/12/icc-note-to-parties-and-arbitral-tribunals-on-the-conduct-of-arbitration-english-2021.pdf> accessed 3 November 2024
[26] The first ICSID case, Trans-Global Petroleum, Inc. v The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/25), invoking the “manifestly without legal merit” test interpreted it to mean “clear and obvious”
[27] Rule 41 ICSID Arbitration Rules 2022
[28] SIAC Annual Reports 2017-2024 <https://siac.org.sg/annual-reports> accessed 14 August 2025
[29] HKIAC Statistics <https://www.hkiac.org/about-us/statistics> accessed 14 August 2025
[30] LCIA Annual Casework Reports 2021-2024 <https://www.lcia.org/lcia/reports.aspx> accessed 14 August 2025
[31] ICSID Secretariat ‘Decisions on Manifest Lack of Legal Merit’ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/cases/content/tables-of-decisions/manifest-lack-of-legal-merit> and ‘The ICSID Caseload – Statistics’ <https://icsid.worldbank.org/resources/publications/icsid-caseload-statistics> accessed 3 November 2024
[32] China Machine New Energy Corporation v Jaguar Energy Guatemala LLC and anor [2020] SGCA 12
[33] DBO and others v DBP and others [2024] SGCA (I) 4
[34] Pursuant to Article 29.1 of the 2016 SIAC Rules
[35] Travis Coal Restructured Holdings LLC v Essar Global Fund Ltd [2014] EWHC 2510 (Comm)
[36] Uttam Galva Steels Ltd v Gunvor Singapore Pte Ltd [2018] EWHC 1098 (Comm), [2019] 1 All ER (Comm) 68
[37] ibid para 17
[38] ibid para 49
[39] Law Commission: Review of the Arbitration Act 1996: Final report and bill (Law Com No 413) (September 2023)
[40] Ministry of Law: Public Consultation on the International Arbitration Act 1994 of Singapore (21 March 2025)
[41] Sundaresh Menon, ‘Dispelling Due Process Paranoia: Fairness, Efficiency and the Rule of Law’ in Lawrence Boo and Gary B. Born (eds) (2021) Volume 17 Issue 1 Asian International Arbitration Journal (Kluwer Law International) 1, 27